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2024 was an extremely eventful year and not every crisis or war can get the individual follow up videos it might deserve. So to kick off 2025, we are going to zoom out and look at some of the wars and crisis we covered from late 2023 to assess what actors and countries came out as strategic winners (or losers) over the course of 2024.

In the air and at sea, we've discussed the ways in which drones have become steadily more important on the Ukrainian battlefield. For the most part however, assets on the ground have looked more conventional - armour, infantry, artillery etc. As time goes on though, that may be changing. UGVs have steadily become more numerous - laying and clearing mines, defending and assaulting positions, carrying supplies and augmenting and supporting infantry and manned vehicles. In this episode, we take a look at this aspect of the Ukrainian robot wars and ask what the future might hold as UGVs grow more advanced and ever more numerous.

Every war of attrition has at least two sides. Recently on this channel, we dove into estimates of Russian equipment losses and their remaining stores of equipment after nearly three years of hard fighting ( • Russian Equipment Reserves (2024) - Produc... ). Today, we're turning a similar lens on Ukraine. There will be some differences, more focus on foreign assistance and less on domestic storage levels for example, but the core question is similar. How are Ukraine's stocks of heavy equipment holding up as we head into 2025, how has the composition of the force changed, and what might that mean for the balance of the war and any negotiations going forward.

There was a time when the USA held a practical monopoly over stealthy combat aircraft. In late December 2024, the PRC showed off two in a single day - one of which doesn't appear to have a direct, active equivalent in the US or any allied air force. Today, I discuss these new aircraft with guest contributor Justin Bronk of the The Royal United Services Institute and ask what they might mean both for the modernisation of the PLAAF and the wider military balance.

Last week we looked at some of the new military aircraft China showed off in the closing days of 2024. Today, I continue my discussion with RUSI's Justin Bronk to cover off other nations efforts to develop their own next generation platforms, from the US NGAD effort to European and Russian programs.

We've talked a lot on this channel about what it takes for nations to fight conventional wars - but with a flurry of new US tariffs announced on targets from the PRC to Canada, Mexico I thought it was time to talk about the mechanics of trade wars. While we mostly give the situation between the US and its tariff targets a bit more time to develop, today we'll look at some of the theory behind trade wars, what factors can give nations advantages in them, as well as some of the risks that can be involved.

Larger, but older, is probably a fair summation of the Russian (and Ukrainian) military in 2025 as compared to 2022. I've often focused on questions of equipment or economics rather than manpower regarding the war in Ukraine - in part because of how hard casualties and recruitment are to estimate. With the war now approaching the end of its third year however, I thought it was necessary to bring together some of the data we have to look at the Russian recruitment and casualty story since Feb 2022. I do however also want to include an illustrative warning. The challenge with trying to bring together multiple estimates is we can't always be sure when estimates are independent vs when they derive from each other The Russian sources for example are likely drawing on a similar dataset or talking points - and the UK MoD figures included in this episode appear to reference Ukrainian numbers. That should sound a massive note of caution on how to approach these numbers.

Yes, I can give you an example of historical logistics so bad it involves planners essentially forgetting that all people need to eat... The great challenge of running a channel that covers one topic a week is that there is always far more than one topic worth covering in any given week. To help cover some more ground then I took questions from Patrons and subscribers and today, am going to take a shot at covering as many as possible. From evaluating new weapons in Ukraine, to defence economics, to diving into a historical example of military logistics so bad it hurts to read, there's hopefully something here for everyone. Thank you to all of you who submitted questions, and if you find it wasn't covered today, that may be because I expect to address it in a future video or post.

For three quarters of a century, the NATO alliance has been a fixture of European and North American security. Now however, the allies are embroiled in a very public split and the call by some European leaders has been for more defence independence from the USA. Today, we look at some of the military capabilities the rest of NATO have, what independence might mean, and some of the economic, technical, and political barriers to achieving it.

Most of the time, major international developments and policy changes are slow and incremental. Sometimes, they are dramatic and sudden. Over the course of the last few months US foreign policy has shifted significantly - and with it, the balance in Ukraine. This episode I look at the evolution of the war since our last quarterly update to set a baseline for what to expect as negotiations and policy decisions play out - and start to introduce some of the major changes we've already seen, from the US aid freeze to escalating European commitments.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine kicked off a significant increase in military spending across NATO with the vast majority of NATO members hitting their spending targets by 2024. The diplomatic fissures with the United States in 2025 however, have prompted an even more dramatic response and many allies now seem to be prioritising greater independence from the U.S. and U.S. products alongside the goal of greater military readiness. With the EU introducing the ReArm Europe plan, Germany moving to exempt most defence spending from debt restrictions and many alliance members now planning defence ramp-ups, today we look at some of those plans. This episode covers a few of the initiatives and efforts we've seen announced so far, what they could achieve, what the dynamics of alliance members attempting to reduce their often long-running reliance on U.S. arms and equipment.

Between the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a general shift in focus for many militaries towards conventional deterrence and warfighting rather than counterinsurgency operations, recent years have seen strong demand for major platforms and weapon systems. Now, with help of newly released data on 2024 exports and imports from SIPRI, I want to unpack the trends we observed in 2024 and ask what we might expect to see in 2025 as spending levels rise and trans-Atlantic tensions challenge old buying patterns.

One of the great challenges European defence planners face is that defence procurement across the bloc is highly fragmented. There is no single Europe wide force or procurement effort to generate the kind of scales and efficiencies the USA, Russia or the PRC can. But what if there was? It's as close to April 1 as we're going to get this year, and so by popular vote, today we're taking a lighthearted look at the question of whether you could equip a pan-European Defence Force without importing any American platforms or major systems. Is all of Europe agreeing to standardise their equipment realistic? no. But does it illustrate some interesting points about the capabilities and limits of Europe's Defence Industry? Let's find out...

For decades the U.S. has been a leading force in building the global free trade system. Today, we discuss it's effort to reshape it using tariffs and some very wonky math and what that move might mean for the world.

In August 2024, Ukraine seized hundreds of square kilometres of Russia's Kursk region in a surprise offensive. Now, more than six months later, the operation has mostly ended with a Ukrainian retreat to a small holding along the Ukrainian border. In this episode we look at the close of the campaign, lessons arising from it, and ask what might be coming next amidst U.S. lead negotiations and evidence of coming Russian offensive efforts.

From the Red Sea to the War in Ukraine, it's been demonstrated that the US and many NATO states can produce high-quality munitions. What isn't clear is that they can produce them in sufficient quantities, or at low enough prices, to meet the demands of a deteriorating security environment and rising focus on conventional deterrence against peer and near-peer competitors. In this episode I look into how many Western munitions became so expensive, what strategic risks that creates, and some of the methods nations might use to rebuild their stocks without destroying their national budgets in the process.

For decades, the US has been a major part of NATO's European security architecture...and for decades, US administrations have often wished they could divert more of those resources to other theatres. Some succeeded, but others found themselves pushing resources back to Europe in response to some new (often Russia related) crisis. Now the new US administration has made it clear that it wants the focus of US military capabilities to be on deterring the PRC, and for more of the European security role to pass to the European NATO allies. The question is, to what assets could the US potentially transfer, and how effectively could Europe replace them in the near term?

The years since 2022 have seen record global defence spending but it wasn't clear whether the new US Government would follow that same trend in 2025 and beyond. Earlier this week, we got a clue they would, when the Armed Services Committees in Congress put forward a $150 billion package to boost defence spending starting in FY 2025. That is, to be technical about it, a lot of money. So in this episode we crack open this surge of spending and see what it might tell us about the future of the US military.

If there is one thing that the last few years have served to highlight, it's how fragile peace (or at least the absence of active kinetic action) can be. Early May has already seen a series of cross-border strikes exchanged between two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, and the world is now waiting to see if an agreed ceasefire will hold. I've been working on an episode on an episode on Pakistan since late 2024 to go along with my original video on India ( • Indian Defence Strategy - Forces, Potentia... ) and had intended to release it later in 2025. Given the circumstances though, I thought it would be worthwhile to bring the release forward and I hope it can provide some useful context. it will probably be some time yet before there is enough reliable evidence out there to confidently parse what happened with the recent strikes and draw any lessons learned. When I think that can be done, I'll consider a follow up video. Until then, I hope you find this big picture view of

In the 1980s, the U.S. announced an ambition to build a space-based missile shield that could intercept Soviet ICBMS and make nuclear weapons functionally 'obsolete.' It never happened. The technology wasn't there, the costs would have been astronomical and there was always a risk of the Soviets out-scaling the system. After the Cold War ended, U.S. homeland missile defence efforts refocused on rogue and minor actors like North Korea. Now, with the announcement of "Golden Dome', it appears that the U.S. is once again expanding its missile defence ambitions. And so today we look at what's been announced and funded, how it might work, and the brutal economics of complex missile defence.

Peace negotiations often get a lot of PR and those between Russian and Ukraine are no exception. But whether they actually achieve anything concrete is a different question. In this episode then, I go back to what both sides have said about their war goals, their previous demands, and what that might tell us about their outcomes so far and what that might mean for the peace talks to come.

For most of the war in Ukraine, Russia's nearly irreplaceable inventory of strategic bombers have been mostly beyond Ukraine's reach. On 1 June, that changed. Small drones, launched from trucks, swarmed multiple Russian airbases and destroyed what appears to be a double digit percentage of Russia's active bomber inventory. It was a dramatic operation - one that drew immediate attention for its impact, cost effectiveness, and what it signals about the future of the drone threat. So today, let's talk about Операція Павутина, Operation "Spider's web"

In the air, modern combat aircraft can be incredibly potent battlefield and strategic tools. On the ground, they're targets, as burning strategic bombers in Russia now attest after Ukraine's recent operation spiderweb. The threat from small drones and new weapon systems wasn't new - you will find mention of small UAS and other similar threats in Doctrinal documents dating back years. What changed is that the Ukrainians showed it could work - and did it in an extremely public way. Today, I talk about the growing threat to air force assets in their bases, how some major forces are planning to address it, as well as the debate around passive defences like hardened aircraft shelters, decoys, and camo.

Since 13 June, the long-running stand-off between Iran and Israel has escalated to sustained conventional conflict, with a sustained Israeli air campaign against targets within Iran itself, while Iran has retaliated with ballistic missile and drone attacks against Israel. It was a complicated military scenario even before the U.S. intervened directly against 3 Iranian nuclear facilities. Today, I try and parse some of what we've seen so far, and what military observations and lessons we might (cautiously) draw at this early stage.

The Kinetic phase of Israel and Iran's recent war ended almost as suddenly as it began. US intervention was followed with a call for a ceasefire, a demonstrative missile attack by Iran, and then (after some very emphatic social media diplomacy) a ceasefire. In this episode I want to take stock of what we've learned over the last week and the status of Iran's remaining nuclear infrastructure. What I also want to do though is focus on some observations not about the nuclear side of this war, but the impacts of the conventional one. Iran's model of deterrence clearly failed - and in this episode I ask whether consistent under-investment in the regular military and its Air and Air-Defence at the expense of the IRGC and its Ballistic Missiles and proxies mean that Tehran helped hand the Israelis rapid air superiority, and how that may shape the strategic balance and any negotiations in the days and weeks to come.

Before Russia's 2022 invasion, many NATO states spent less than 2% of GDP on defence. In the last few weeks, those same states agreed to more than double that target to 5%...kind of. In this episode, I look a little deeper into what the allies actually agreed at the June NATO summit and what it might mean for the future of the Alliance, Russia, and U.S. - EU relations.

One of the greatest challenges posed by Drones in Ukraine is their sheer availability. Ukraine's long range drone strikes have repeatedly stressed and penetrated Russia's air defence system, while Russia's swarms of Shahed style one way attack drones have scaled and evolved into an ever more dangerous challenge for Ukraine. Looking for affordable options to respond, we've seen sides that the powers may be betting that in In the rock-paper-scissors logic of weapon systems in Ukraine, it may well be that the best counter to Drones....is Drones.

After more positivity in the past, in 2025 the tone from Russian figures about their economy has sometimes been notably more pessimistic - but that doesn't mean Russia's warfighting capacity is exhausted, far from it. And so today we'll cover some of what that means for the war, negotiations, and the impact of potential future U.S. sanctions and tariffs.

The war in Ukraine has dramatically accelerated the development of some military technology - and challenged some older ones. Back in 2022 I looked at one system that had had a pretty hard year - the helicopters, and concluded that while they still had a role (particularly the transport helos), technology and trends were clearly challenging the attack helicopters in new ways. Today, I look at how the situation has arguably gotten even harder in 2025, and how some nations are choosing to revise their plans for these very dangerous (and very expensive) systems.

If the worst thing that can happen to a military is losing a war, sometimes the second worst thing might be winning one. Previously on this channel we've talked about some of the deliberate ways in which leaders might sabotage their own militaries - corruption, falsified reporting or picking political favorites over competent candidates. Sometimes though, a force can be slowly undermined by leaders that don't even know they're doing so - in fact, they may actually think they're doing great. This is the realm of arrogance and overconfidence. In the future, we may dive a little deeper and have a look at examples of how this phenomenon has swung battles and campaigns, but today we're going to look at it at a higher level - how arrogance can limit the ability of a force to evolve, adapt, and avoid future defeat.

Even no deal scenarios can have winners and losers. The war in Ukraine arguably spans many fronts - from the brutal combat of the front lines to the diplomatic arena. In this episode, I explore two aspects of the war that are playing out in parallel - the kinetic fight with a look at recent developments including around Pokrovsk, and also the the diplomatic battle with Putin's trip to Alaska and the upcoming Trump-Zelensky meeting in Washington.

For a military in the middle of a major war, using more infantry might seem like a relatively cheap, quick way to add more combat power to a force - but how cheap is it really? The answer depends on how you value human life and the long term impacts of losses on the economy. And so today, courtesy of a Patron vote, that's what we're going to try and do.

By popular vote, let's talk Russian oil refineries, what makes the strikes this August different to past Ukrainian efforts, and also what might still be missing from Ukraine's ability to maximise the impact on Russia's economy and willingness to negotiate.

Last week we talked oil refineries and the value of being able to strike sensitive economic targets. Today, we talk about the means to try and do that - and Ukraine's efforts to develop hard hitting long range weapons that might let it reach deeper into the Russian interior. The most recent system in that category to get media attention is the so called "Flamingo" cruise missile and today, by popular vote, I want to talk about it for three main reasons: To look at the missile, why Ukraine wants it and what it could mean for the war if produced in quantity To ask why a number of nations around the world are now pursuing or expanding their Ground Launched Cruise Missile Arsenals, in some cases despite previously banning or never possessing them To discuss an example of what it takes to design and produce a system under austere wartime conditions, and what the Flamingo experience might signal for other nations watching the Ukrainian experience that might be concerned about increasing

The modernisation of the People's Liberation Army has been dramatic, rapid, and occasionally secretive. Earlier this month, we got a bit of a window into the equipment side of that transformation process, with Beijing opting to show of dozens of weapon systems (many for the first time publicly) as part of their commemoration of the 80th anniversary of Japan's 1945 defeat. From the start of the 21st Century the PRC has transitioned from being overwhelmingly reliant on derivatives of Soviet and Russian platforms to a country capable of pushing forward with its own designs supported by the world's largest manufacturing base. Today, I look at a selection of those designs and ask what they can tell us about where the PLA is in its modernisation journey, and where it might be going in the future.

While most of the fighting and destruction of the war in Ukraine has been limited to Ukrainian and Russian territory, tensions between Moscow and NATO have always threatened to manifest beyond those borders. This month, multiple incidents have demonstrated that threat clearly, from drones over Poland and Romania to MiG-31s allegedly intruding into Estonian airspace. And so today we look at those incidents, the potential motives behind them, and how NATO has elected, or may elect to respond.

Given the pace of technical and tactical adaptation in Ukraine, there's a pretty constant stream of weapons or other systems that are talked up as the next big potential "game changer." Some of those systems go on to make a difference, others...don't. So roughly once I year I like to look at a collection of things that attracted hype and evaluate how they have actually performed so far and today, it's time for the 2025 edition - covering everything from Oreshnik and interceptors, to shotguns, turtle tanks, and Ukraine's innovative Sky Fortress and Zvook sensors.

Most of us instinctively understand the idea of peace and war economies. The difference between the two reflects the fact that under ordinary circumstances, you probably want people focusing on things other than just turning out as many munitions as possible. But how do you move from one to the other? And why do nations so often get it so badly wrong. From supply chain seizures to a surge in corruption, in this episode I go through some common ways the transition to war process can fail, setting us up for a future episode on a topic that's arguably even more important. How can you avoid the pitfalls and make sure you get it right?

Well - this is a bit of a different one. I spent most of last week with a team of NATO officers (OF3-5) and civilian experts gaming out a fictional invasion scenario as they tested new command concepts and approaches. Today, I give you a bit of a look at how that played out, asking why militaries wargame, what happened with this one, and what I took from it. Next episode we'll pivot to the other aspect of this event which was focused on tech, innovation and lessons learned from Ukraine - but for now, let's talk about the latest Donovian invasion of OTSO.

How do you make sure you learn the right lessons from a war your troops aren't actively fighting in? The war in Ukraine is pressure cooker of technical and tactical innovation, and as militaries around the world are well aware, those innovations are unlikely to remain contained to the Ukrainian battlefield. And so today, in my second episode on NATO's SHINE event in Istanbul, I have a look at how NATO and Ukraine are trying to learn from each other and look at some of the technologies that they showed off for answering major battlefield threats like Russian glide-bombs and fiber-optic drones. It may be likely that not all lessons from Ukraine will apply to future wars, but countries have a clear imperative to learn those that might. And so today, let's talk JATEC, innovation challenges and...air-mines?

Apologies for the sound quality on this one - there will be a significant improvement next week as I switch equipment. Another week, another Russian nuclear superweapon - but this time, it's a bit of a head scratcher. The new Burevestnik missile essentially revives a concept (the intercontinental cruise missile) that both the USSR and USA discarded back in the 1960s. Despite its intimidating NATO reporting name (SSC-X-9 Skyfall), Russia's nuclear powered cruise missile is arguably worth looking at not so much because of what it can do, but because of what it likely can't. The question of why a country would choose to fund something like this over and above thousands of other much reasonable and urgent priorities gives us a chance to dig into Russia's priorities and the historical tendency of many states to back blingy superweapons at the expense of more boring, useful investments.

Most of the time on this channel, we focus on military developments in Europe or Asia. but the global surge in military spending since 2022 is also playing out in Africa. There, Algeria deserves particular mention, more than doubling expenditure since 2021 to cement it's place (by no small margin) as Africa's most expensive military and one of the most important remaining customers for Russian arms exports. By some estimates, In 2025, Algeria may end up dedicating more of its budget to the military during peacetime, than Russia is during wartime - with reported procurement plans stretching all the way to Russian 5th generation fighters. It's a move that is driving massive fiscal deficits and which raises massive questions, especially in the context of Algeria's comparatively opaque approach to military procurement: What is Algiers planning to spend the money on? Why now? How will the region respond and can the Algerian economy sustain the effort? So, for the first time for a nati

Russia began 2025 expressing confidence in its battlefield prospects. Putin talked about creating new buffer zones and finishing off the Ukrainian military. Most of a year later, Russia's gains have again been mostly incremental while Ukraine's ability to strike against valuable Russian targets in the rear has steadily grown. But despite Russia falling short of their likely goals, Ukraine is clearly under immense pressure. The infantry force is under-strength, the force is stretched, and Russian infiltration tactics, have delivered territorial gains, albeit at a steep price. This episode then, we look at the Russian Autumn offensive, some of its major fronts (especially Pokrovsk), how the fighting has evolved and what it might tell us about the status of the two forces going into another winter that is expected to be colder and harder than the previous one.

Many countries have gotten pretty good at producing cutting edge military equipment - but cheap equipment is often a different matter. With the war in Ukraine demonstrating that quantity and affordability can sometimes matter as much as raw capability, today (by patron vote), I want to unpack some of the reasons countries can sometimes struggle to build equipment for less than eye-watering prices - and what options might be available to try and narrow the cost gap with more economical competitors.

There's a lot that goes into having a capable navy - but being able to design and build quality warships usually helps. Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has been able to design and introduce a range of new designs including a new supercarrier and the Virginia class submarine. But attempts to build new surface combatants have struggled. Zumwalt, LCS...and now the Constellation class Frigate. Now announced as cancelled, Constellation (FFG-62) was meant to be a safer option, based on a proven parent design and critical to future US shipbuilding plans. So today, we ask why the U.S. turned to a Frigate program, how it fit into the struggle to modernise the post cold war fleet, and what the end of the program might mean for the USN.